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This paper examines the role 
International Intergovernmental 
Organization (IGO) memberships 
have on defense expenditures, 
arguing that state leaders substitute 
high military spending rates for 
IGO membership as the information 
transmission mechanisms of IGOs 
offer more accurate information 
about the security environment that 
diminishes the need for military 
spending. States do not become 
pacifists as they are integrated into 
the international network of IGOs; 
rather, they find a reduced usefulness 
in and need for a robust military. 
This project empirically tests this 
relationship, and findings indicate 
a small but significant relationship 
between military spending and IGO 
membership. The most integrated 
states experience a 1 percent 
reduction in their overall military 
spending rates. However, this 
only applies to non-security IGOs. 
Contrary to previous findings, 
security IGOs have no consistent 
influence on military spending. 
INTRODUCTION 
Military spending remains a major 
spending priority for most states. As 
Bohmelt and Bove (2014) articulate, 
using Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) data, the 
world allocated $1.753 trillion (US 
Dollars) in 2 0 12 for military expen -
ditures. The question of why states 
spend money on the military has been 
widely addressed by a large literature 
within politic al science .1 In general, 
this literature has concluded that states 
respond to the international security 
environment and create budgets that 
are the product of domestic political 
processes which often include numer-
ous actors with varying interests and 
levels of influence. States, who live in 
a chaotic and often anarchical world, 
pursue multiple security solutions 
simultaneously, including establishing 
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military competency and strength, defence alliances, forging economic 
ties, and utilizing the tools of diplomacy. States can substitute one policy 
option for another in their pursuit of security, leading security policy and 
defense spending to be influenced by a range of factors. 2 Recent modeling 
of military spending has confirmed and determined that the major factors 
in determining military spending are regime type, militarized conflict, the 
military budgets of allies and enemies and their geographic proximity, eco-
nomic capacity, and the previous year's budget.3 These variables contribute 
to a nearly complete assessment of military spending decisions. However, 
the current analysis leaves out small but important contributing factors to 
military spending decisions. 
States, who live in 
a chaotic and often 
anarchical world, 
pursue multiple security 
solutions simultaneously, 
including establishing 
military competency 
and strength, defense 
alliances, forging 
economic ties, and 
utilizing the tools of 
diplomacy. 
One such small contributing factor 
that the literature has not examined is 
the role International Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IGOs) play in shaping 
military spending decisions. The litera-
ture examining the role ofIGOs on state 
behavior has primarily focused on the 
role of overlapping memberships and 
militarized conflict,4 has examined IGO 
influence mainly in a dyadic context, and 
has demonstrated that IGO membership 
can reduce the propensity of states to 
engage in militarized disputes, assist in 
the resolution and management ofter-
ritorial disputes, reduce the duration of 
disputes, and facilitate trade. 5 This literature has found that IGOs are formed 
to coordinate security needs, a primary concern of states, by establishing 
credible commitments and opportunities for cooperation.6 
This paper argues that IGO membership directly influences state lead-
ers, who become accustomed to the dispute resolution mechanisms pro-
vided by IGOs, and who further become dependent upon IGO networks 
which shape the strategic choices states make. The literature has examined 
the role IGOs play in providing information, offering opportunities for 
communication and meditation with other states, and their influence in 
regulating the normative behavior of states around security issues.7 Many 
40 
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IGOs are products of major powers and the balance of power within the 
international system, yet they retain their own individual ability to shape 
state behavior and interests. States who join IGOs are buying into global 
governance, which is in part controlled and directed by major powers, 
mainly the United States (U.S.). IGOs, however, signal and indicate a 
state's willingness to participate in such governance, and further provide 
structures for states to interact in the international system. For example, 
participating in IGOs may signal to the U.S. that a state is on board with 
its leadership, but it also provides opportunity for cooperation with other 
states. In other words, the role of IGOs is a mixture of varying types of 
influence. On one side IGOs provide an opportunity for hegemons to 
funnel power, while on the other IGOs 
offer a structured means to govern rela- On one side IGOs 
tions in the international system without 
such hegemonic influence.8 Given that 
the hegemon does not intervene in every 
conflict or crisis, there is evidence to sug-
gest that IGOs are independent of major 
powers, at least for some of the time, and 
work to fill the power vacuum, and thus 
help establish the rules of state interac-
tions and behavior. This paper argues 
that it is this influence that has been 
provide an opportunity 
for hegemons to funnel 
power, while on the other 
IGOs offer a structured 
means to govern relations 
in the international 
system without such 
hegemonic influence. 
unaccounted for in previous examinations of military spending patterns. 
The influence ofIGOs does not turn states into pacifists; rather, they 
find a reduced need for a robust military. IGOs memberships and partici-
pation in global governance work to diminish the attractiveness of high 
military budgets in light of additional information gained through repeated 
interactions. State leaders face competing demands for limited resources, 
as winning coalitions demand state resources in exchange for leadership 
support. In order to meet these demands, leaders look for low cost policies 
that allow for the simultaneous implementation of policies in other arenas. 
Leaders learn that they can substitute high military spending rates for IGO 
memberships, as states develop and become accustomed to the pacific influ -
ence ofIGOs. Domestic winning coalitions demand military spending, but 
this has largely been the product of undemocratic regimes and hegemonic 
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status.9 This paper argues that a portion of the costs of providing security 
can be offset by participating in global governance, because the informa-
tion gained from the repeated interactions that IGOs facilitate works to 
develop relationships between states and solidify reputations that foster 
cooperation and exchange information about capabilities and interests. 
The information from IGOs makes it more difficult for domestic political 
actors to advocate for high military spending rates, as behavior about other 
states disseminates through a country. 
To test this hypothesis, I examine the role of IGO membership in 
defense spending outcomes using country-year data. I combine the model-
ing approach employed by recent military spending research, 10 and couple 
it with IGO data. The findings indicate that while IGOs work to reduce 
military spending, it is on average a small percentage of overall defense 
spending. Since IGOs are not created equally, I break down the IGO variable 
into security and non-security orientated organizations using Boehmer et al 
( 2004). I find that it is the non-security organizations that actually reduce 
military spending, while security organizations when examined on their own 
have no discernable influence. These findings support the hypothesis that, 
of all the causal mechanisms identified in the literature that allow IGOs 
to influence conflict behavior, it is informational exchanges that work to 
decrease tensions and help illuminate domestic political decisions, because 
non-security IGOs do not provide their member states with a promise of 
a defensive military coalition. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly 
examine the theoretical underpinnings of the IGO conflict literature. From 
there I develop a theoretical framework which argues that IGO member-
ship reduces military spending through the interaction of domestic political 
demands, and then derive my hypothesis from this discussion. I then outline 
my research design, present my results and conclude with a discussion of 
my findings. 
THE BENEFITS OF IGO MEMBERSHIP 
Liberals, Constructivists, and Realists contest the role ofIGOs in interna-
tional relations, yet combined they provide a holistic and balanced under-
standing of how IGOs shape state behavior. Realists downplay the power 
42 
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of IGOs to influence state behavior, while Liberals and Constructivists 
highlight their influence, albeit in slightly different ways. Liberals argue 
that IGOs can, independently of their membership characteristics, shape 
the behavior of member states in two general ways. First, IGOs have the 
ability to increase opportunities for communication between states by pro-
viding a forum for the safe transmission of signals, as well as structures to 
mediate their conflicts. 11 IGOs have credibility that states lack, and when 
they communicate their interests by threatening sanctions, embargos, or 
other types ofleverage, they can effectively mediate conflicts between states 
in jeopardy of escalating to a militarized conflict. 12 Second, information 
transmission increases transparency between states by forcing them to clarify 
their positions in numerous interactions within the structure of the orga-
nization, thus reducing uncertainty 
between potential adversaries as to 
their intent, interests, and strategies. 13 
This argument is succinctly outlined 
in the seminal work of Russett and 
Oneal (2001), who identify six causal 
mechanisms that IGOs perform to 
help keep the peace between member 
Realists downplay the 
power of IGOs to influence 
state behavior, while 
Liberals and Constructivists 
highlight their influence, 
albeit in slightly different 
states: (1) enforce norms, (2) mediate ways. 
among conflict parties, (3) informa- -------------
tion conveying = reduced uncertainty, ( 4) expands nation's concept of 
self-interested into long term, ( 5) socialization and shaping norms such as 
democratic ones, and ( 6) generating narratives of mutual identification. A 
number of scholars have defended these causal mechanisms with substantial 
evidence. 14 In short, a consensus among Liberals has agreed that IGOs 
have the ability to 'affect the understanding, environment, and interests of 
states. ' 15 While the specifics of the argument evolve, such as those arguing 
that IGOs choose their members with the intent of avoiding conflict16 or 
causing conflict17, and debates with realists remain, the consistent argu-
ment has been that in certain contexts IGOs can have a pacific effect on 
state behavior. 
While liberals root their theory in the rational choice calculations states 
make in response to IGO actions, constructivists argue that IGOs teach 
states new behaviors and alter their identities and thus their priorities. 18 
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Given that IGOs are formulated and designed to facilitate cooperation 
between states, Constructivist arguments are consistent with the position 
taken in this paper, that IGO membership has the ability to reorganize the 
security needs of the state, and can reduce military spending. IGOs shape 
the policy and normative behavior of states, which see the international 
community as more conflict-resolution orientated, and who view the use 
of military leverage as less acceptable. Constructivists further argue that 
these practices produce customs which define acceptable behavior, such as 
the norms surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. 19 
Realists, who see IGOs as merely an extension of state power, and 
as unable to independently shape state behavior, reject all of the above 
described Liberal and Constructivist mechanisms.20 Realists present strong 
support for their arguments, as the driving force behind the creation of 
many IGOs were major powers, whose motivation was to create institutions 
that could manage their international affairs and advance their interests. 
Hegemons may be crucial to the creation ofIGOs; however, once created 
IGOs can influence and shape state behavior beyond the intention of major 
powers.21 While some debate remains, a consensus has emerged among 
many international relations scholars that IGOs shape state behavior. 
IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING 
Building from this literature, this paper argues that IGOs influence the 
amount of resources states choose to allocate toward the military. The causal 
mechanisms behind this influence is the role of information exchanges, 
facilitated by membership in IGOs. Decisions about military spending 
are made by leaders who face competing demands from their winning 
coalitions for limited state resources.22 All executives must confront the 
anarchical world, and are thus forced to provide the public good of secu-
rity, i.e. the protection of the state from internal or external threats. States 
utilize militaries to provide the public good of security, but in addition they 
also build alliances and join IGOs. This paper posits that IGOs provide a 
substitution policy for state leaders, in that they reduce the utility of using 
military force to achieve state interests, thus reducing tension between states 
and the probability of conflict. States become conditioned to the pacific 
mechanisms ofIGOs and utilize these mechanisms to prevent conflict and 
44 
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reduce tension, in turn minimizing the pressure to maintain high levels 
of military spending. States do not eliminate their militaries nor do they 
refrain from conducting modernization efforts or research and development; 
rather, the reduced need and utility of the military in the face of demands 
for other public goods forces leaders to make tough choices, one of which 
is reducing levels of military spending. 
States' decision making is dependent on information flows to and from 
the executive leadership. Information in an anarchical world is riddled with 
falsehoods and misinformation, as states are incentivized to misrepresent 
their capabilities and interests. However, states cannot misrepresent long 
without consequences, and a great deal can be learned about a nation-state's 
interests from observing their behavior. IGOs are a formal setting where 
such behavior can be observed, and remains a major forum where the 
transmission of information between 
states can occur. States offer their 
official position on a variety of issues 
ranging from economic to social and 
everything in between. While many 
of these positions obfuscate the truth, 
IGOs are a formal setting 
where state behavior 
can be observed, and 
many are substantive and can reveal a . . 
state's economic political securitv or of mformat1on between 
remains a major forum 
where the transmission 
' ' J' 
social concerns. For example, Saudi states can occur. 
Arabia's motivation to head the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights highlights the misrepresentation states can 
engage in given the Saudi's known behavior, but likewise Saudi Arabia's 
position on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' pro-
duction targets reveals another state interest. In some cases the detailed 
information can be specifically about military spending. Consider the 
Aridean Community's (CAN) Lima 2002 Commitment, where the mem-
ber states of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela agreed, in 
part, to declare the region free from air-to-air missiles and from nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons, and made a commitment to eradicate 
illicit weapons trafficking and anti-personal landmines. 23 While most of the 
weapons being banned were beyond the means or strategic interests of the 
member states, weapons trafficking remains a real threat to the stability of 
member states. In addition, the agreement called for greater transparency 
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' ' ' social concerns. For example, Saudi states can occur. 
Arabia's motivation to head the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights highlights the misrepresentation states can 
engage in given the Saudi's known behavior, but likewise Saudi Arabia's 
position on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' pro-
duction targets reveals another state interest. In some cases the detailed 
information can be specifically about military spending. Consider the 
Aridean Community's (CAN) Lima 2002 Commitment, where the mem-
ber states of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela agreed, in 
part, to declare the region free from air-to-air missiles and from nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons, and made a commitment to eradicate 
illicit weapons trafficking and anti-personal landmines.23 While most of the 
weapons being banned were beyond the means or strategic interests of the 
member states, weapons trafficking remains a real threat to the stability of 
member states. In addition, the agreement called for greater transparency 
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in military spending behavior. Over time it is not difficult for states to gain 
a somewhat accurate picture of the internal workings of another country on 
military spending issues, but all other interests as well, however incomplete 
their understanding is. 
This information is coupled with the personal relationships that develop 
in repeated interactions organized by IGOs. Individual diplomats can build 
relationships, and in the very least reputations for being reasonable, accurate, 
and honest. While double and triple crosses and other such drama occurs, 
the bulk ofinteractions transmit reliable and accurate information. Personal 
avenues of information exchanges remain critical and widely used mecha-
nisms that shape policy maker perceptions and understandings of the exact 
threat posed by international actors. For example, media reports discussing 
Beyond the personal 
relationships of 
diplomats, states make 
credible commitments 
within the processes 
governed by IGOs. 
various international negotiations and 
meetings often discuss the reputation 
of individual diplomats, often in a posi-
tive light. Some reports are obviously 
the product of crafty communication 
strategies. However, others are success-
ful at their jobs because they effectively 
communicate. Consider the long time 
Saudi diplomat Bandar Bin Sultan, who 
maintained his credentials through four presidents as the Ambassador to 
the U.S. from 1983-2005. Personal relationships matter in such repeated 
interactions, and work to facilitate better understanding between countries. 
Beyond the personal relationships of diplomats, states make credible 
commitments within the processes governed by IGOs.24 These credible 
commitments work to bolster follow-through in agreements, including 
the accuracy and amount of information states provide on their official 
positions. It is this information that helps states discern the interests, 
position, and motivation of other states. As states gain a more accurate 
understanding of other states, their budgetary process becomes better 
informed, and executives can make informed choices on where to put their 
limited resources. This information may be detailed and useful, and ranges 
from the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention on 
Transparency in Conventional Arms Acquisition requiring the exchanging 
ofinformation regarding arms purchases,25 to the North Koreans requesting 
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food assistance from the United Nations (UN) Food Assistance Program 
in September of2015.26 In the OAS case, states actually know what other 
states in the region are doing, to some degree, on arms purchases, while 
in the UN case China, Japan, the U.S. and others have a better sense of 
domestic problems facing a weak and belligerent rogue state. The point 
is that in either case a picture is being transmitted through the informa-
tion diffusion opportunities offered by IGO structures, diminishing the 
possibility that state security planning operates on a worst case scenario. 
IGOs facilitate domestic fact-based budgeting, as opposed to fear based, 
with fact-based diminishing spending requirements. 
Authoritarian leaders are especially prone to this influx of information, 
as the bulk of public spending is distributed among the political, economic, 
and military elite of the country. While 
they do not have the same demands 
on their spending choices as demo-
cratically-elected executives, they are 
still restrained by their own domestic 
political environment and need to hold 
together a winning coalition requiring 
distribution of state funds. 27 These 
leaders use the information they obtain 
from the international community, and 
rearrange their military spending deci-
sions based on the threat assessment 
they find in the international security 
environment. These information flows 
occur in the repeated interactions they 
IGO memberships reduce 
the military spending 
by having additional 
information about how 
other states are preparing 
for possible future 
military action. States 
can properly adjust their 
strategic decisions, as 
opposed to working with 
incomplete information. 
enjoy with countries they have overlapping IGO memberships with. 
IGO memberships reduce the military spending by having additional 
information about how other states are preparing for possible future military 
action. States can properly adjust their strategic decisions, as opposed to 
working with incomplete information. As Jervis (1976) has noted, there are 
many different types of misperceptions, and while I GOs do not provide total 
transparency of other state's military planning,28 the increased information 
they provide is more than the limited and questionable information utilized 
in previous state military planning,29 a situation which historically led to 
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is that in either case a picture is being transmitted through the informa-
tion diffusion opportunities offered by IGO structures, diminishing the 
possibility that state security planning operates on a worst case scenario. 
IGOs facilitate domestic fact-based budgeting, as opposed to fear based, 
with fact-based diminishing spending requirements. 
Authoritarian leaders are especially prone to this influx of information, 
as the bulk of public spending is distributed among the political, economic, 
and military elite of the country. While 
they do not have the same demands 
on their spending choices as demo-
cratically-elected executives, they are 
still restrained by their own domestic 
political environment and need to hold 
together a winning coalition requiring 
distribution of state funds.27 These 
leaders use the information they obtain 
from the international community, and 
rearrange their military spending deci-
sions based on the threat assessment 
they find in the international security 
environment. These information flows 
occur in the repeated interactions they 
IGO memberships reduce 
the military spending 
by having additional 
information about how 
other states are preparing 
for possible future 
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overstatements on an adversary's abilities and fueled arms races. Consider 
the most conservative of Turkey's security elite, whose tension with Greece 
continues to occupy substantial portions of their military planning. Turkey's 
recognition as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership unveiled 
their military capabilities to Greek policy makers, and created new path-
ways of information that shaped both Turkey and Greece's policy debates 
about how much security to acquire, thus reducing the required amount 
of military spending in both countries. Specifically, beyond Greece ending 
their veto to Turkey's EU candidacy, Turkish leaders learned more about 
Greece's willingness to resolve the Cypriot question peacefully. 30 While 
Turkey still considers Greece a threat, Turkish policy leaders are armed with 
information obtained though the EU accession process that can inform 
Turkey's recognition as a 
candidate for European 
Union (EU) membership 
unveiled their military 
capabilities to Greek 
policy makers, and 
created new pathways of 
information that shaped 
both Turkey and Greece's 
policy debates. 
their decision making. Information 
exchanges can diminish the power of 
hawks, reduce uncertainty, and result 
in more pacific policies being adopted, 
given that failure to pursue an aggressive 
security policy may prove disastrous. 31 
While some information sharing may 
empower hawks and confirm suspicions, 
it is the contention of this paper that 
more often information sharing has a 
pacific effect, as both states are look-
ing to produce only as much security 
as needed given the other spending 
demands on the state. 
The sharing of such information occurs through the routinized interac-
tions of state leaders within the structures ofIGOs. 32 While the structures 
of IGOs promote competition and may amplify policy differences, they 
also allow for bargaining space to be created for cooperation and compro-
mise, which opens the door to a reduction of tension and an avoidance of 
conflict. IGOs do not eliminate these conflicts; rather, they provide the 
structures to reduce conflict as well as tension. 33 By providing additional 
information, states can more effectively plan their security choices. The 
interactions between states within IGO work to clarify positions and dispel 
myths about state interests and ideas about action. 34 Given that few state 
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leaders view militarized conflict as a risk-free and productive avenue to 
achieve their ends, such exchanges will reduce the necessity for high levels 
of military spending. 
More than simple information exchanges, many IGOs offer the oppor-
tunity for states to engage in structured discussions and agreements on 
important and vital security issues and explore possible actions to take in 
response to them. This exchange of signals, widely theorized and discussed 
in the literature, provides the kind of exchange and communication that 
can alter the internal decision-making processes of states. The credible 
commitments and leverage mechanisms that enforce compliance of agree-
ments are important for governing state behavior, but such endeavors 
start with repeated interaction and information exchanges. Even the most 
contentious relationships can benefit 
from the exchange of signals. Consider On their own, the conflict 
the current conflict between Iran, the resolution and pacific 
mechanisms of IGOs 
may not shape military 
spending allocation by 
states; however, such 
decisions are not solely 
the product of foreign 
affairs, they are deeply 
rooted in domestic 
U.S. and several Western states over 
the Iranian nuclear program. Current 
sanctions35 implemented by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
are to be lifted only when Iran ceases 
suspected enrichment activity under 
the recently announced deal between 
the U.S., Russia, France, England, and 
Iran. Clearly, the adversarial states in 
this conflict have successfully commu- institutions. 
nicated their positions without resorting ------------• 
to a direct military encounter. 36 This example illustrates the ways in which 
IGOs serve as a forum for communication for even the most hostile of 
dyads. Moreover, iflranians fulfill their portion of the agreement and allow 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into their nuclear 
facilities, they can expect certain behaviors from the U .S and the IAEA. In 
this case, both countries would not have had to allocate as many resources 
to the military if the structures of the IAEA and its information transmission 
capacity were not in place. It is the exchange of information within IGOs 
that allows the construction and implementation of such arrangements. 
On their own, the conflict resolution and pacific mechanisms ofIGOs 
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leaders view militarized conflict as a risk-free and productive avenue to 
achieve their ends, such exchanges will reduce the necessity for high levels 
of military spending. 
More than simple information exchanges, many IGOs offer the oppor-
tunity for states to engage in structured discussions and agreements on 
important and vital security issues and explore possible actions to take in 
response to them. This exchange of signals, widely theorized and discussed 
in the literature, provides the kind of exchange and communication that 
can alter the internal decision-making processes of states. The credible 
commitments and leverage mechanisms that enforce compliance of agree-
ments are important for governing state behavior, but such endeavors 
start with repeated interaction and information exchanges. Even the most 
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may not shape military spending allocation by states; however, such deci-
sions are not solely the product of foreign affairs; they are deeply rooted in 
domestic institutions.37 State leaders face competing demands for limited 
state funds, as their winning coalitions demand state resources in exchange 
for leadership support. Leaders work to maintain the support needed to 
retain office either electorally in democracies or via the distribution of private 
goods authoritarian leaders must deliver to maintain power.38 This cannot 
be achieved solely by providing security to the public; thus, leaders pursue 
the simultaneous implementation of policies in multiple arenas (education, 
transportation, health care, etc) in order to maintain support, and are under 
great pressure to do so. Leaders work to implement as many successful 
policies as possible, and thus are motivated to pursue low cost policies that 
achieve their goal ofretaining the support of winning coalitions. As states 
develop and become accustomed to the pacific mechanisms ofIGOs, leaders 
learn they can substitute high military spending rates for other goods that 
bolster the support of their winning coalitions. 39 As argued above, the costs 
of providing security for the state can be offset by participating in global 
governance, developing relationships and reputations that foster coopera-
tion, and resolving conflicts before they escalate through the mechanisms 
ofIGOs, as such components ofIGOs bolster security and reduce the need 
for high rates of military spending. Forces such as a rivalry or war clearly 
still retain the power to increase military spending rates in the presence of 
IGO membership, as the power of IGO memberships cannot overcome 
all security considerations or threats. However, domestic pressure for state 
resources simplifies where spending can be cut. IGO memberships clarify for 
leaders where security policy can be shifted to meet the other demands on 
the state. The argument presented here is not that IGOs work to eliminate 
militaries or fully substitute their role in providing security for the state, but 
rather that IGOs lower the requirement for defense spending, which states 
take advantage of, given the competing demands leaders face to allocate 
state resources to other public and private goods in order to retain power. 
The international relations literature asserts that there are a large 
number ofinfluences on military spending.40 These influences are not zero-
sum; they collectively culminate into a state's decisions on the size of the 
military budget.41 Formally, the demand for military expenditures can be 
expressed most simply as M = F(S, NS, I), where S= security environment, 
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NS=non-security factors, such as wealth and domestic politics, and !=inertia, 
which captures the lagged influence of the previous year's budget and 
country specific effects. To date the S portion of the equation has been 
under-theorized, in that IGO memberships have been left out of previous 
analyses. Past contributions to the literature, such as Smith (1989), Flores 
(2011), and others have modeled security in a limited fashion, such as S= 
F(AS, ES, IS), with AS=allied spending, ES= enemy spending, and IS= 
security threats. This paper expands on the field's understanding of what is 
considered in S by adding IGO memberships to the equation. This addition 
is important given the ability ofIGOs to alter the security environment of 
states, as detailed above. States with strong economies, engaged in a mili-
tarized conflict, or facing domestic insurgencies all can expect their defense 
budgets to vary. While IGOs play a role in the defense budget process, 
they are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for defense budgets to 
vary. In other words, IGOs can reduce military spending, but they are not 
required to reduce military spending, as other factors play a larger role in 
the defense budget process. However, the sufficient condition does not 
hold in some circumstances, such as states in full scale war. While some 
states may be excluded from some IGOs for defense policy decisions, the 
bulk of IGOs do not prevent membership based on high defense spend-
ing rates.42 The more IGOs a state is a member of, the greater number of 
joint memberships a state has with the nations of the world, and the more 
information exchanges, however small, a country will engage in with other 
nations. In total, the above literature leads to the following hypothesis, 
which guides this study: 
HI: States who are members of intergovernmental organizations will 
reduce their military spending) relative to states that retain fewer IGO 
membership. 
TESTING THE ARGUMENT 
The data utilized in this study is drawn from Bohmelt and Bove's (2014) 
analysis of military spending rates, who gathered their base model from 
Nordhaus et al (2012).43 These two projects utilized country-year panel 
data for the 1952-2000 time period and represent the current consensus 
among IR scholars on how to model military spending. The major addition 
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of this project is an analysis of the role IGOs play in determining military 
expenditures, which further limits the temporal scope of this project to 
1965-2000.44 
The dependent variable for this study is the share of GDP allocated to 
the defense budget, measured in constant US Dollars, with a transformation 
to account for purchasing power parity and log.45 The data is drawn from 
both SIP RI and Correlates of War (COW) Project, with data from SIP RI 
providing the 1988-2000 period, and 1965-1987 period being drawn from 
the COW data. The defense expenditure data contains all financial resources 
available to the military in time of war, and contains all resources that 
could be deployed in a time of conflict, regardless of their active or reserve 
status.46 Military spending data has been criticized for being inaccurate 
Capturing state 
involvement in an IGO 
has several options. The 
one employed here is 
a simple measurement 
of membership, as all 
IGO memberships have 
the ability to deliver 
information regardless of 
their focus. 
and difficult to properly measure given 
the general withholding of information 
states engage in around their security 
planning. Lebovic (1999) criticized the 
COW dataset, which builds from both 
the SIPRI and the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA, now 
Bureau of Arms Control). Lebovic's 
main concern is use of the COW dataset 
in studies that focus on limited samples 
arranged by year or geographic region. 
He concluded, however, that the use of 
the dataset was appropriate for larger 
samples, such as the one employed 
here.47 The argument that Lebovic (1999) makes is that while specific values 
of defense spending may be inaccurate, the general directionality is correct. 
Therefore, this research, which aims only at uncovering directionality, is 
not harmed by this set of issues in the data. 
Capturing state involvement in an IGO has several options. The one 
employed here is a simple measurement of membership, as all IGO mem-
berships have the ability to deliver information regardless of their focus. 
The independent variable of interest, Total I GO Membership, captures the 
number ofIGO memberships a state holds in a given year.48 In calculating 
this variable, observer and associate memberships are eliminated, making 
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Total IGO Membership simply the total number of full IGO memberships 
a given state had in a given year. For example, the U.S. was a member of 
96 organizations out of a possible 337 organizations in 1993, making 
the value for Total IGO Membership for the U.S. in 1993 96. Total IGO 
Membership captures the level of integration of a state into I GO networks, 
in comparison to other states and over time, and considers the growth of 
IGOs in the international system.49 The military alliances of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact are removed from the sample, and added to the alliance 
data. That integration serves as the undercurrent to the theoretical argu-
ment presented above; as states become more and more integrated into 
the international community, the number of ties they have with other 
states in the IGO context produces more options for resolving conflicts, 
and thereby reshapes the security planning of the state. States join a variety 
of types of organizations, and each of them, it is argued here, have the 
capacity to deliver information. While some IGOs may be better positioned 
to transmit information, each IGO offers states an opportunity to publicly 
position themselves on a range of issues, and thus transmit information to 
other states, and vice versa. 
While I argue that all IGOs transmit information, it is clear that not 
all IGOs are created equal with regards to their capacity and institution-
alization.50 This therefore constitutes a major drawback to Total IGO 
Membership, as it does not distinguish between IGOs. I argue that security 
IGOs are particularly well positioned to transmit information concerning 
critical security issues that further facilitate the reduction of military spend-
ing. This study therefore parses out the varying influence security IGOs 
have on state military spending decisions. To do so, this study borrows 
criteria from Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) to identify these 
security IGOs. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) suggest that 
highly institutionalized security IGOs are more able to shape the security 
behavior of states and contain the following three elements: 1) a high level of 
institutionalization, 2) member cohesion, and 3) a specific security mandate. 
Further, they demonstrate that these highly institutionalized IGOs with 
security mandates do more to reduce the probability of conflict between 
member states than organizations without such structures, as they possess 
the "organs or mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, or adjudication aimed 
at conflict resolution and the enforcement of organizational decisions."51 
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of this project is an analysis of the role IGOs play in determining military 
expenditures, which further limits the temporal scope of this project to 
1965-2000.44 
The dependent variable for this study is the share of GDP allocated to 
the defense budget, measured in constant US Dollars, with a transformation 
to account for purchasing power parity and log.45 The data is drawn from 
both SIP RI and Correlates of War (COW) Project, with data from SIP RI 
providing the 1988-2000 period, and 1965-1987 period being drawn from 
the COW data. The defense expenditure data contains all financial resources 
available to the military in time of war, and contains all resources that 
could be deployed in a time of conflict, regardless of their active or reserve 
status.46 Military spending data has been criticized for being inaccurate 
Capturing state 
involvement in an IGO 
has several options. The 
one employed here is 
a simple measurement 
of membership, as all 
IGO memberships have 
the ability to deliver 
information regardless of 
their focus. 
and difficult to properly measure given 
the general withholding of information 
states engage in around their security 
planning. Lebovic (1999) criticized the 
COW dataset, which builds from both 
the SIPRI and the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA, now 
Bureau of Arms Control). Lebovic's 
main concern is use of the COW dataset 
in studies that focus on limited samples 
arranged by year or geographic region. 
He concluded, however, that the use of 
the dataset was appropriate for larger 
samples, such as the one employed 
here.47 The argument that Lebovic (1999) makes is that while specific values 
of defense spending may be inaccurate, the general directionality is correct. 
Therefore, this research, which aims only at uncovering directionality, is 
not harmed by this set of issues in the data. 
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52 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2016 
I IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING 
Total IGO Membership simply the total number of full IGO memberships 
a given state had in a given year. For example, the U.S. was a member of 
96 organizations out of a possible 337 organizations in 1993, making 
the value for Total IGO Membership for the U.S. in 1993 96. Total IGO 
Membership captures the level of integration of a state into I GO networks, 
in comparison to other states and over time, and considers the growth of 
IGOs in the international system.49 The military alliances of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact are removed from the sample, and added to the alliance 
data. That integration serves as the undercurrent to the theoretical argu-
ment presented above; as states become more and more integrated into 
the international community, the number of ties they have with other 
states in the IGO context produces more options for resolving conflicts, 
and thereby reshapes the security planning of the state. States join a variety 
of types of organizations, and each of them, it is argued here, have the 
capacity to deliver information. While some IGOs may be better positioned 
to transmit information, each IGO offers states an opportunity to publicly 
position themselves on a range of issues, and thus transmit information to 
other states, and vice versa. 
While I argue that all IGOs transmit information, it is clear that not 
all IGOs are created equal with regards to their capacity and institution-
alization. 50 This therefore constitutes a major drawback to Total IGO 
Membership, as it does not distinguish between IGOs. I argue that security 
IGOs are particularly well positioned to transmit information concerning 
critical security issues that further facilitate the reduction of military spend-
ing. This study therefore parses out the varying influence security IGOs 
have on state military spending decisions. To do so, this study borrows 
criteria from Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) to identify these 
security IGOs. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) suggest that 
highly institutionalized security IGOs are more able to shape the security 
behavior of states and contain the following three elements: 1) a high level of 
institutionalization, 2) member cohesion, and 3) a specific security mandate. 
Further, they demonstrate that these highly institutionalized IGOs with 
security mandates do more to reduce the probability of conflict between 
member states than organizations without such structures, as they possess 
the "organs or mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, or adjudication aimed 
at conflict resolution and the enforcement of organizational decisions."51 
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These structured organizations contain assemblies, secretariats, bureaucra-
cies to implement policy, formal rules and procedures, and have security 
cooperation as an integral part of the organization's founding documents. 52 
Interventionist organizations have the above elements combined with 
mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and adjudication and other means 
to coerce state decisions, the means to enforce organizational decisions and 
norms, and a specific security mandate. These elements oflnterventionists or 
Security IGOs constitute the institutionalization referenced above, as these 
IGOs have the capacity, resources, and bureaucratic capacity that have the 
ability and means to effectively communicate private information. For an 
IGO to have a security mandate, the founding documents must indicate a 
security intention for the organization.53 This project argues that all IGOs 
have some ability to transmit information, but security IGOs are better 
positioned to communicate critical information that ultimately shape state 
security spending decisions. 
The variable, Total Security IGOs, is a simple count variable calculated 
by summing the number of security organizations a state is a member of in 
a given year. 54 To control for the influence of non-security IGOs, a modi-
fied version of Total IGO Membership (Total Non-Security IGOs) minus 
the Total Security IGO variable is added to the model to evaluate which 
type of organization influence military spending. The two variables, Total 
Security IGO and Total Non-Security IGO, correlate at .82. 
I utilize the modeling strategy employed by Bohmelt and Bove ( 2014) 
who build on Nordhaus et. al. (2012 ), whose base model is as follows: 
Military Spending (ln) = Total IGO Memebership +Peace Years+ democ-
racy+ trade/GDP+ Contiguity+ allies+ GDP /World GDP+ number of states 
in system + GDP(logged) + military spending foes+ military spending allies 
+ lagged dependent variable + error term 
Military Spending (ln) is converted into constant US Dollars measured 
with purchasing power parity and log transformed, and is represented as a 
share of GDP. 55 Peace Years counts the number of years since a state was 
involved in any fatal MID. Fatal MIDs are preferred to wars, as they are more 
common and capture the ongoing security threats of the state (Lake 2009; 
Nordhaus et al 2012). Democracy has been widely theorized to result in a 
54 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016 
r 
IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING 
reduction in military spending, with empirical results providing support, and 
is drawn from the polity data (Marshall and Jaggers 2004).56 The share of 
the overall GDP that is related to trade is the simple product of those two 
figures, which is included to capture the ranking of the country in a given 
year relative to the rest of the world. Given that economic power is a major 
predictor of military spending, it is also included in the model. Having both 
captures economic changes from year to year, and also the relative influence 
a country will have in the international system. The data for both share 
an overall GDP drawn from the Gleditsch data. 57 Given that neighboring 
countries often pose the largest security threat, a measure of contiguity is 
also included. 58 The Number of States in the System, as Bohmelt and Bove 
( 2014) state, "simply counts the number of existing countries in a given 
year."59 To account for the influence of other countries military spending 
levels, two separate measures capturing the military spending of foes and 
allies are added to the model, both drawn from Nordhaus et al (2012). 
These figures categorize states as friends or foes based on the similarity of 
alliance portfolios, with the top half of portfolios being considered friends, 
and the bottom half foes. 60 Lastly, a lagged dependent variable is included 
in the model to account for bureaucratic inertia. 61 All states in which there 
are tens years of data are included in the model. 62 I use pooled time-series 
data which includes all states for which data are available, which amounts 
to over 4400 observations for the time period of 1965-2000.63 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Three modeling strategies are utilized to estimate the relationship between 
military spending and IGOs. The main modeling strategy utilizes Prais-
Winsten regression \vith correlated Panels Corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
to account for an AR-1 process found in this time series data on account 
of the lagged dependent variable. To ensure robustness, I also used cluster 
analysis, fixed effects, and regional indictors. Tables 2 and 3 display the 
results from the nine models run. Model 1 is the base model without either 
IGO variable. Model 2 contains the simple count of Total IGO member-
ships as the primary independent variable, which produces a negative and 
significant coefficient. Model 3 removes the Total IGO Membership Count 
variables, and adds the disaggregated IGO variables, Total Security IGOs 
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These structured organizations contain assemblies, secretariats, bureaucra-
cies to implement policy, formal rules and procedures, and have security 
cooperation as an integral part of the organization's founding documents.s2 
Interventionist organizations have the above elements combined with 
mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and adjudication and other means 
to coerce state decisions, the means to enforce organizational decisions and 
norms, and a specific security mandate. These elements oflnterventionists or 
Security IGOs constitute the institutionalization referenced above, as these 
IGOs have the capacity, resources, and bureaucratic capacity that have the 
ability and means to effectively communicate private information. For an 
IGO to have a security mandate, the founding documents must indicate a 
security intention for the organization. 53 This project argues that all I GOs 
have some ability to transmit information, but security IGOs are better 
positioned to communicate critical information that ultimately shape state 
security spending decisions. 
The variable, Total Security IGOs, is a simple count variable calculated 
by summing the number of security organizations a state is a member of in 
a given year. 54 To control for the influence of non-security IGOs, a modi-
fied version of Total IGO Membership (Total Non-Security IGOs) minus 
the Total Security IGO variable is added to the model to evaluate which 
type of organization influence military spending. The two variables, Total 
Security IGO and Total Non-Security IGO, correlate at .82. 
I utilize the modeling strategy employed by Bohmelt and Bove (2014) 
who build on Nordhaus et. al. (2012), whose base model is as follows: 
Military Spending (ln) = Total IGO Memebership +Peace Years+ democ-
racy+ trade/GDP+ Contiguity+ allies+ GDP /World GDP+ number of states 
in system + GDP(logged) + military spending foes+ military spending allies 
+ lagged dependent variable + error term 
Military Spending (ln) is converted into constant US Dollars measured 
with purchasing power parity and log transformed, and is represented as a 
share of GDP.ss Peace Years counts the number of years since a state was 
involved in any fatal MID. Fatal MIDs are preferred to wars, as they are more 
common and capture the ongoing security threats of the state (Lake 2009; 
Nordhaus et al 2012). Democracy has been widely theorized to result in a 
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reduction in military spending, with empirical results providing support, and 
is drawn from the polity data (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). 56 The share of 
the overall GDP that is related to trade is the simple product of those two 
figures, which is included to capture the ranking of the country in a given 
year relative to the rest of the world. Given that economic power is a major 
predictor of military spending, it is also included in the model. Having both 
captures economic changes from year to year, and also the relative influence 
a country will have in the international system. The data for both share 
an overall GDP drawn from the Gleditsch data.s7 Given that neighboring 
countries often pose the largest security threat, a measure of contiguity is 
also included. 58 The Number of States in the System, as Bohmelt and Bove 
(2014) state, "simply counts the number of existing countries in a given 
year. " 59 To account for the influence of other countries military spending 
levels, two separate measures capturing the military spending of foes and 
allies are added to the model, both drawn from Nordhaus et al (2012). 
These figures categorize states as friends or foes based on the similarity of 
alliance portfolios, with the top half of portfolios being considered friends, 
and the bottom half foes. 60 Lastly, a lagged dependent variable is included 
in the model to account for bureaucratic inertia. 61 All states in which there 
are tens years of data are included in the model.62 I use pooled time-series 
data which includes all states for which data are available, which amounts 
to over 4400 observations for the time period of 1965-2000.63 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Three modeling strategies are utilized to estimate the relationship between 
military spending and IGOs. The main modeling strategy utilizes Prais-
Winsten regression \vith correlated Panels Corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
to account for an AR-1 process found in this time series data on account 
of the lagged dependent variable. To ensure robustness, I also used cluster 
analysis, fixed effects, and regional indictors. Tables 2 and 3 display the 
results from the nine models run. Model 1 is the base model without either 
IGO variable. Model 2 contains the simple count of Total IGO member-
ships as the primary independent variable, which produces a negative and 
significant coefficient. Model 3 removes the Total IGO Membership Count 
variables, and adds the disaggregated IGO variables, Total Security IGOs 
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Table 1: Total IGO Membership and Defense Burden 1965-2000 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
PCSE PCSE PCSE IGO PCSE only Only Non 
No IGO Var IGOs Disaggregated Security IGOs Security 
Base Model IGOs 
Total IGO -.001 *** 
Membership (.0004) 
Security -.001 -.006** 
IGOs (.002) (.002) 
Non -.001 * -.0009* 
Security (.0006) (.0004) 
IGOs 
Peace Years -.0004* -.0002 -.0003" -.0003* -.0003* 
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Trade/GDP .004 .006* .007* .006* .005* 
(.003) (.0031) ( .003) (.003) (.003) 
Regime -.004*** -.003** -.003** -.003** -.003*** 
Type (.0009) (.0009) .0009 (.001) (.0009) 
Contiguity .002 .004* .004* .003* .003* 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0016) 
Allies -.0001 .0004 .0002 .0005 -.0001 
(.001) (.001) .001 (.001) (.001) 
GDP-Share .273 .124 .159 .124 .252 
(.226) (.228) (.231) (.231) (.224) 
GDP (In) .082*** .093*** .092*** .09*** .087*** 
(.012) (.013) (.013) (.013) ( .012) 
Spending .030 .028 .027 .03 .032 
Foes (.024) (.023) ( .023) (.024) (.024) 
Spending -.007 -.006 -.007 -.005 -.006 
Friends (.008) (.0085) .008 (.008) (.008) 
Lagged DV .919*** .915 .915*** .916*** .918*** 
(.Oll) (.Oll) (.Oll) (.Oll) (.Oll) 
Constant -.615 -.621 -.589 -.618 -.655 
( .403) (.3930) (.391) (.396) ( .402) 
R2 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 
N 4641 4492 4492 4492 4492 
***p s.001 **p s.01 *ps .05 "ps .10 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
56 
tFor Model 5 GDP per capita is switched out for a logged GDP variable 
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Table 2: IGO Membership and Defense Burden 1965-2000 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 
Regions Dropped Highly 
Integrated States 
Security IGOs -.003 (.002) -.002 (.002) 
Non Security IGOs -.001" (.0007) -.001* (.0006 
Peace Years -.0002 (.0002) -.0003" (.0001) 
Trade/GDP .004 (.003) .008* (.003) 
Regime Type -.003** (.001) -.003*** (.0009) 
Contiguity .002 (.001) .005 (.001) 
Allies -.0002 (.001) .0005 (.001) 
GDP-Share .400 (.270) -.759 (.532) 
GDP (In) .099*** (.013) .098*** (.014) 
Spending Foes .021 (.024) .032 (.025) 
Spending Friends -.001 (.008) -.006 (.008) 
North America -.002 (.04) 
South America -.026 (.027) 
Europe .013 (.029) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.013 (.029) 
Middle East .092** (.28) 
Asia -.001 (.020) 
Lagged DV .905*** (.010) .912*** (.Oll) 
Constant -.560 (403) -.684 (.419) 
R2 .97 .97 
N 4492 4212 
***p s.001 **p s.01 *ps .05 "ps .10 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
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( .001) (.001) (.001) 
Allies -.0001 .0004 .0002 
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(.226) (.228) (.231) 
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Table 2: IGO Membership and Defense Burden 1965-2000 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 
Regions Dropped Highly 
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Trade/GDP .004 (.003) .008* (.003) 
Regime Type -.003** (.001) -.003*** (.0009) 
Contiguity .002 (.001) .005 (.001) 
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GDP-Share .400 (.270) -.759 (.532) 
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Spending Friends -.001 (.008) -.006 (.008) 
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South America -.026 (.027) 
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and Total Non-security IGOs. The results indicate that it is the non-security 
IGOs that have a negative influence on military spending, while security 
IGOs have a positive but non-significant influence on defense spending 
rates. Models 4 and 5 each profile the security IGO and non-security IGO 
membership variables, with each coefficient being negative and significant, 
indicating that while the non-security IGO variables remain consistent 
from model 3, the security IGOs variable switches direction and becomes 
negative and significant. Total Security IGOs and Total Non-security IGOs 
Count correlate at the .82 level. 
Drawing on the results contained in model 3, the Clarify program64 
was used to produce fixed effects and offer a better understanding of the 
influence of the variables of interest on military spending. The results 
suggest the average state has a less than 1 percent reduction of military 
spending, as they move from the lowest to the mean value in non-security 
IGOs. In other words, a state with both the average military spending 
rate and average number of non-security IGOs has a .7 percent reduction 
in military spending in a given year based on what the findings of model 
3 suggest. States with the average military spending rate who have the 
highest number of non-security IGOs reduce their military budgets by 
2 percent. In substantive terms, this model indicates that a country such 
as Spain, the country with the closest to the average defense spending in 
2012, would reduce their military spending by US $807 Million (2012) 
a year if they had the average number of non-security IGO member-
ships.65 Given that Spain is more integrated than the average country in 
the international network of IGOs, that figure is likely higher based on 
the models' findings. The suggestion from the model is that the influence 
that non-security IGOs have, while a small percentage, could constitute 
a substantial sum for many countries. Take Jamaica in 1996, for example, 
whose economy was in the tenth percentile of the sample, was member of 
16.6 percent of the active IGOs that year, and saved nearly $17 million 
dollars, a substantial sum for a nation of less than three million people. 
Such funds may have been utilized to tackle social issues such as education 
or health care, resulting in a measurable increase in the standard of living, 
or amounting to a de facto tax cut. On the other side of the spectrum, the 
Netherlands, whose economy in 1996 was in the 90th percentile for the 
sample, held memberships in 3lpercent of active organizations, resulting 
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Figure 1: First Differences for Security and Non-Security IGOs 
Security IGOs ~ lt--9-1 
Non-Sec IGOs I • I 
Peace Years 
Trade/ GDP 
Regime Type 
Contiguity 
Allies 
GDP Share 
Logged GDP I • I 
Foe Mil$ 
Friend Mil$ 
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 
in a calculated savings of 2.6 billion or 24 percent of their defense.66 The 
average country by both economic size and IGO membership saved over 
$133 million dollars in military spending a year, while countries in the 90th 
percentile of economic size saved over $2.1 billion a year.67 These results 
suggest a strong negative relationship between membership in IGOs and 
military spending, and provides support for Hypothesis 1, which suggests 
that non-security IGO memberships lead to a reduction in militarization. 
Figure 1, built from model 3, captures the first differences graphically, and 
indicates the strong decline in military spending levels as states increase the 
value of non-security IGOs. 
Table 2 examines models that add regional indicators to the analysis. 
Model 6 is an amended version of model 3, adding regional indicators to 
the modeling.68 Only the Middle East variable was significant, and its posi-
tive coefficient suggests that relative to the reference category, suggesting 
that Middle Eastern nations were more likely to have higher rates of mili-
tary spending compared to the other regions. Further, the coefficient for 
non-security IGOs falls from a significance level of .025 in model 3 to .07 
in model 6, indicating that some of the influence ofIGOs can be in part 
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and Total Non-security IGOs. The results indicate that it is the non-security 
IGOs that have a negative influence on military spending, while security 
IGOs have a positive but non-significant influence on defense spending 
rates. Models 4 and 5 each profile the security IGO and non-security IGO 
membership variables, with each coefficient being negative and significant, 
indicating that while the non-security IGO variables remain consistent 
from model 3, the security IGOs variable switches direction and becomes 
negative and significant. Total Security IGOs and Total Non-security IGOs 
Count correlate at the .82 level. 
Drawing on the results contained in model 3, the Clarify program64 
was used to produce fixed effects and offer a better understanding of the 
influence of the variables of interest on military spending. The results 
suggest the average state has a less than 1 percent reduction of military 
spending, as they move from the lowest to the mean value in non-security 
IGOs. In other words, a state with both the average military spending 
rate and average number of non -security I GOs has a . 7 percent reduction 
in military spending in a given year based on what the findings of model 
3 suggest. States with the average military spending rate who have the 
highest number of non-security IGOs reduce their military budgets by 
2 percent. In substantive terms, this model indicates that a country such 
as Spain, the country with the closest to the average defense spending in 
2012, would reduce their military spending by US $807 Million (2012) 
a year if they had the average number of non-security IGO member-
ships.65 Given that Spain is more integrated than the average country in 
the international network of IGOs, that figure is likely higher based on 
the models' findings. The suggestion from the model is that the influence 
that non-security IGOs have, while a small percentage, could constitute 
a substantial sum for many countries. Take Jamaica in 1996, for example, 
whose economy was in the tenth percentile of the sample, was member of 
16.6 percent of the active IGOs that year, and saved nearly $17 million 
dollars, a substantial sum for a nation of less than three million people. 
Such funds may have been utilized to tackle social issues such as education 
or health care, resulting in a measurable increase in the standard of living, 
or amounting to a de facto tax cut. On the other side of the spectrum, the 
Netherlands, whose economy in 1996 was in the 90th percentile for the 
sample, held memberships in 3lpercent of active organizations, resulting 
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Figure 1: First Differences for Security and Non-Security IGOs 
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in a calculated savings of 2.6 billion or 24 percent of their defense.66 The 
average country by both economic size and IGO membership saved over 
$133 million dollars in military spending a year, while countries in the 90th 
percentile of economic size saved over $2.1 billion a year.67 These results 
suggest a strong negative relationship between membership in IGOs and 
military spending, and provides support for Hypothesis 1, which suggests 
that non-security IGO memberships lead to a reduction in militarization. 
Figure 1, built from model 3, captures the first differences graphically, and 
indicates the strong decline in military spending levels as states increase the 
value of non-security IGOs. 
Table 2 examines models that add regional indicators to the analysis. 
Model 6 is an amended version of model 3, adding regional indicators to 
the modeling.68 Only the Middle East variable was significant, and its posi-
tive coefficient suggests that relative to the reference category, suggesting 
that Middle Eastern nations were more likely to have higher rates of mili-
tary spending compared to the other regions. Further, the coefficient for 
non-security IGOs falls from a significance level of .025 in model 3 to .07 
in model 6, indicating that some of the influence ofIGOs can be in part 
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explained by regional characteristics. Model 7 examines this premise by 
removing the most integrated states69 in the dataset and re-running model 
3. In this scenario, the results are consistent with model 3, as non-security 
IGOs having a negative and significant influence on military spending 
rates. 70 Model 8 is a fixed-effects model that produces results consistent 
with model 3. Further, alternative sets of control variables did not alter the 
results. I dropped peace years and added a simple count ofMIDs in a given 
year, added civil wars, regional instability (which is a count of civil wars 
and MIDs occurring in neighboring states), rivalry, a Cold War dummy, 
and major power, all which did not alter the results in any significant 
way. Further, I split the alliance variable into major power alliances (U.S., 
Russia/Soviet Union, France, UK, China) and non-major power alliances, 
with the results that were consistent with model 3, and in a model not 
reported here dropped alliances all together with results consistent with 
model 3 as well. This indicates that the influence of alliances is diminished 
with the presence ofIGOs. Further, there is evidence from the models to 
suggest that even while controlling for alliances with major powers, that 
non-security IGOs work to reduce military spending. These findings help 
illustrate how IGOs are important factors in military spending decisions. 
Tests for panel unit roots indicated stationary data. 71 Lastly, cluster analysis 
on standard errors was used with results consistent with model 3. In all, 
the data was not sensitive to alterations and the findings of model three 
were consistently with the robustness checks utilized. 
CONCLUSION 
This research contributes to the literature by starting a conversation about 
the possibility of a more nuanced understanding of how IGO memberships 
shape state decision making around a critical component of state behavior. 
This research suggests that membership in IGOs, specifically non-security 
IGOs, reduces military spending rates. As states increase the number ofIGO 
memberships, they reduce, albeit in small numbers, the size of their military 
budgets. States use the information gained from repeated IGO interactions 
to inform their understanding of the global security environment, and it is 
the more common and repeated interactions that in non-security IGOs with 
a diverse set of states that help reduce military spending, not security-I GOs 
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where member states are more likely to have strong pre-existing bilateral 
relationships. Information from IGOs change the internal calculations of 
states, who can substitute IGO membership for military strength, with the 
influence ofIGOs extending beyond dyadic relationships. Yet the findings 
also undermine the position that IGOs are inherently a pacific force in 
the international system, as security IGOs have no discernable influence 
on military spending rates. The expectation of the theory presented here 
is that as states increase their participation in IGOs, they will reduce their 
military spending rates, not eliminate or dramatically reduce them. States 
continue to retain their ability to defend themselves as they increase their 
IGO memberships. These are slight changes, amounting to no more than 
2 percent of defense spending for the 
most integrated states, and a tenth of a 
percent for the least. The findings sug-
gest that IGOs matter, but not nearly as 
much as economic power, regime type, 
or conflict. 
While this research establishes the 
link between certain types of I GOs and 
reductions in military spending, there 
are clear directions future research can 
take. First, the results here do not isolate 
specific IGOs, aside from those that do 
not have a security mandate, and thus 
we cannot tell for sure the exact nature 
or specific functions various IGOs carry 
This research suggests 
that membership in 
IGOs, specifically non-
security IGOs, reduces 
military spending rates. 
As states increase 
the number of IGO 
memberships, they 
reduce, albeit in small 
numbers, the size of their 
military budgets. 
out. This suggests that more research is needed to evaluate what particu-
lar information transmission processes work to reduce military spending 
rates. Further, the results do not identify what kind of military spending 
changes occur. Militaries may be making changes in strategy, such as fewer 
troops and more intelligence spending. Future work should investigate 
these shortcomings. 
This research has direct policy implications. States should consider 
how their commitments to security IGOs shape their defense planning, 
and examine if those commitments are undermining their overall security 
agenda. Policy makers can also consider actions that either increase the 
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where member states are more likely to have strong pre-existing bilateral 
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states, who can substitute IGO membership for military strength, with the 
influence ofIGOs extending beyond dyadic relationships. Yet the findings 
also undermine the position that IGOs are inherently a pacific force in 
the international system, as security IGOs have no discernable influence 
on military spending rates. The expectation of the theory presented here 
is that as states increase their participation in IGOs, they will reduce their 
military spending rates, not eliminate or dramatically reduce them. States 
continue to retain their ability to defend themselves as they increase their 
IGO memberships. These are slight changes, amounting to no more than 
2 percent of defense spending for the 
most integrated states, and a tenth of a 
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out. This suggests that more research is needed to evaluate what particu-
lar information transmission processes work to reduce military spending 
rates. Further, the results do not identify what kind of military spending 
changes occur. Militaries may be making changes in strategy, such as fewer 
troops and more intelligence spending. Future work should investigate 
these shortcomings. 
This research has direct policy implications. States should consider 
how their commitments to security IGOs shape their defense planning, 
and examine if those commitments are undermining their overall security 
agenda. Policy makers can also consider actions that either increase the 
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number of effective IGOs or strengthen the ties with preexisting member-
ships. Such action arguably will free up resources for investment in educa-
tion, health care, emerging industries or possible tax cuts, all factors that 
determine the health of a society in a global economy. States can continue 
to utilize IGOs to coordinate collective state action, communication, and 
facilitate conflict resolution mechanisms in the context of a dispute. It is 
clear that some of these institutions are working to reduce the threat of 
militarized conflict and facilitate state cooperation on shared interests. 
Appendix A: List of Security IGOs 
African Union 
Arab League 
Arab Maghreb Union 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Commonwealth oflndependent States Charter 
Commonwealth Secretariat 
Economic Community of Central African States 
Economic Community of West African States 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
European Economic Community /European Community 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Inter-American Conference on Social Security 
Inter-American Investment Corporation 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration/International Organization for 
Migration 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
International Bank for Economic Cooperation 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
International Bureau for the Protection of the Moselle against Pollution 
International Bureau for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution 
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property 
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International Civil Defense Organization (ICDO) 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
International Labor Organization 
International Monetary Fund 
Latin Union 
Nordic Council of Ministers 
Nordic Development Fund (NDF) 
Nordic Economic Research Council 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Organization of American States 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
Organization of the Islamic Conference 
Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Southern African Development Community 
United Nations 
Western European Union 
World Trade Organization 
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43. The data was provided by Bohmelt and Bove, available here: http:/ /the-
data.harvard.edu/ dvn/ dv /researchandpolitics. Both Bohmelt and Bove (2014) 
and Nordhaus (2012) offer detailed discussions of the data and their placement 
in the model. In this analysis portion of this project, variations on the model and 
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and Trends, 1972-1988,'' Journal of Public Policy. 12(2): 105-152; Dunne, J. 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016 67 
PEACE THROUGH PARTNERSHIP 
that offer strength and aggression over the promise of reciprocal cooperation have 
greater appeal to most voters, citizens, and policy makers. 
32 Fausett and Volgy (2010). 
33. Ibid. 
34 Oneal and Russett (2001). 
35. While there are several sanctions currently implemented by the UNSC, 
here I am referring to Resolution 1737 (2006). 
36. Some scholars argue that sanctions are a form of conflict; the point being 
made here is that no militarized violence occurred (See Oudraat 2000). Based on 
this previous research, it is not surprising to find that some policy makers have 
argued that Iran and the U.S. are fighting a proxy war in Iraq (NYT 4/12/2008 
"Iran Fighting Proxy War in Iraq, Envoy Says."), and it is safe to assume that 
U.S. Intelligence agencies are working to infiltrate key Iranian institutions for the 
purpose of sabotage and intelligence gathering. However, the nuclear issue is one 
of many points of contention, and the ongoing interactions in Iraq and elsewhere 
do not take away from the fact that the two states have not gone to war directly 
with one another. 
37. Goldsmith, Benjamin. (2003). "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: 
Why Spend More?" Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47(5): 551-73.; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2003). 
38. Although many authoritarian leaders must distribute private goods to 
maintain power, evidence suggests that public goods are also part of the calculus 
in retaining power. See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003 ). 
39. Certainly some authoritarian state leaders retain their positions by appeas-
ing military leaders or coup-proofing, which drives up military spending rates. 
However, there is an upper bound to this resource distribution, and thus such 
authoritarian leaders can be shaped by IGOs in similar ways as democracies. 
40. Goldsmith (2003, 2007) and Smith (1989) are representational of the 
approach the fields of economics and political science have theorized on the 
demand for military spending. Goldsmith, Benjamin (2003) "Bearing the Defense 
Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?,'' Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(5): 
551-73; and Goldsmith, Benjamin (2007) "Defense Effort and Institutional 
Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory: Why Try Harder?" Security Studies 
16(2): 189-222. 
41 See for further discussion Fordham, Benjamin and Walker, Thomas 
(2005) "Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do 
Democracies Spend Less?" International Studies Quarterly, 141-15 7; Goldsmith 
(2003, 2007). 
66 
42. Most IGOs have a social or economic mandate as opposed to a security 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016 
r 
IGO MEMBERSHIP AND MILITARY SPENDING 
mandate which would demand certain behaviors. Consider the WTO, which has 
no security requirements for admission. 
43. The data was provided by Bohmelt and Bove, available here: http:/ /the-
data.harvard.edu/ dvn/ dv /researchandpolitics. Both Bohmelt and Bove (2014) 
and Nordhaus (2012) offer detailed discussions of the data and their placement 
in the model. In this analysis portion of this project, variations on the model and 
different estimation techniques are utilized. 
44. 1965 is the start year, as it is the first consecutive year in which the 
Correlates ofWar International Organization data set has data, prior to 1965 data 
is coded in five year increments. 
45. Nordhaus et al. (2012); Bohmelt and Bove (2014). 
46. This data uses Defense Burden as a share of the economy (GDP) rather 
than its absolute value, as opposed to direct military spending data, because nations 
have varying levels of population, land mass, and size of economy. Using raw 
defense spending data would create a measurement error, as it would be difficult 
to tell whether or not the change in defense spending was a function of some other 
variable. The decision to do this is consistent with previous contributions to the 
literature (Goldsmith 2003, 2007; Bohmelt and Bove (2014). 
47. Goldsmith (2003) provides an overview of how he dealt with Lebovic's 
critique, a position that this paper supports. 
48. The COW data counts 494 organizations that span from 1815-2005, and 
not all were in operation during the period of study. 1996 had the highest num-
ber with 336 organizations. Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin 
Warnke (2004). "The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0," 
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21 ( 2): 101-119. 
49. The top scores ofTotal IGO Membership are among European countries 
during the 1960s and early l 970's. 
50. See Shannon et al (2010) Shannon (2010); Boehmer et al (2004). 
51. Boehmer et al. (2004), 17. 
52. See Boehmer et al for additional information on their coding procedures. 
53. As Boehmer et al. (2004) argue, this does not mean that security IGOs 
have to have the capacity to deploy peacekeppers or otherwise militarily intervene. 
Rather, the purpose and mandate of the organization has to include a security 
focus. 
54. A list of these organizations can be found in appendix A. The criteria is 
drawn directly from Boehmer et al. ( 2004). 
55. Nordhaus et al. (2012). 
56. Hewitt, Daniel ( 1992). "Military Expenditures. Worldwide: Determinants 
and Trends, 1972-1988,'' Journal of Public Policy. 12(2): 105-152; Dunne, J. 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 
VOL. XXXIII NO. 3 SEPTEMBER2016 67 
PEACE THROUGH PARTNERSHIP 
Paul and Mohammed, Nadir A.L. (1995), 'Military Spending in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Some Evidence for 1967-85." Journal of Peace Research. (32)3: 331-343; 
Goldsmith (2003, 2007); Fordham and Walker (2005 ). The evidence from these 
contributions clearly demonstrates that democracies have lower rates of military 
spending than non-democracies. Moreover, democratic countries will be more 
susceptible to the substitution that IGOs offer states, given the closer connection 
between leader retainment and appeasement of the winning coalition with public 
goods spending. Data for regime type comes from the Polity Project. Marshall, 
Monty (2004). Polity IV Dataset. Available at: http:/ /www.systemicpeace.org/ 
polity /polity4.htm. 
57 There are a number of contributions that examine this influence, includ-
ing Benoit, Emile (1973). Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries, 
Lexington Books: New York; Rasler, Karen A., and William R. Thompson (1992). 
"Political-Economic Tradeoffs and British Relative Decline,'' In Defense, Welfare, 
and Growth, ed. Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, London: Routledge Kegan Paul: 
36-60; and Smith (1989). 
58. This is a simple count of the number of sea or land based borders a given 
country has and is drawn from the COW data. 
59. Bohmelt and Bove (2014), 3. 
60. Nordhaus et. al. (2012). 
61. Smith (1995). 
62. The following countries are not included in the modeling. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
63. Missing data is not a major concern for this study. There are a number of 
observations of missing data for military spending, but they do not pose problems 
in terms of biasing the results given how few observations are missing. 
64. Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King (2003). "CLARIFY: 
Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." Journal of Statistical 
Software, 8. Copy at http:/ /j.mp/k3k0rx. 
65. This calculation is based on the average non-security IGO value, not Spain's 
actual Non-security IGO percentage value, which is not available for 2012. 
66. This figure was calculated by taking the projected savings of the budget 
and adding it to the final military budget for 1996, and then calculating what 
percentage it made up. 
67. All figures drawn from the analysis are in 1996 US Dollars. 
68. The regions are North America, South America, Europe, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania as the reference category in model 6. 
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69. I dropped from the analysis the 10 percent of observations (country-years) 
with the highest Total IGO Membership score. 
70. These include France, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Italy, which are the eight most integrated 
states. An additional model not reported here that included the regional indicators 
but not the eight most integrated states produced similar results as model 3. 
71. The Stata command xtunitroot was used which combines a number of 
unit roots or stationarity in panel datasets. 
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